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Quetelet and the emergence of the 
behavioral sciences
Gustav Jahoda*
Abstract 
Adolphe Quetelet was one of the most prominent figures of the second half of the nineteenth century, yet in present-
day histories of several social sciences the impact of his ideas is widely ignored. The first part consists of a sketch of 
his life and work. Astronomer and statistician, he sought to apply the mathematical tools of astronomy to create was 
has been called a ‘mathematics of society’. In particular he demonstrated regularities in the incidence of various social 
phenomena, notably crime, whose implications were widely debated. In the second part the influence he exerted 
on some key figures in the then emerging social sciences is traced in some detail; these figures include Durkheim, 
Galton, Marx, and Tylor. He also advocated the wider use of statistics and his call had a powerful impact on the then 
emerging fields such as administration, economics, sociology and psychology. He influenced some of his most 
famous contemporaries, including Florence Nightingale, Karl Marx and Francis Galton.
Keywords: Quetelet forgotten, Statistics, Determinism, Influence, Nineteenth century, Behavioural sciences
© 2015 Jahoda. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate 
if changes were made.
Lambert Adolphe Jaques Quetelet (1796–1874) was one 
of the major igures of his period, justly celebrated inter-
nationally by his contemporaries. He made an enormous 
impact on the emerging behavioural sciences in the nine-
teenth century. Yet his fame is now eclipsed, as indicated 
by the sub-title of an article by Desrosières (1997): ‘from 
pedestal to oblivion’. his is not altogether true, since in 
general histories of the social sciences, like that by Roger 
Smith (1997), his ideas are usually discussed. Moreover, 
there is an extensive specialised literature dealing with 
Quetelet, much of it fairly recent. But most of it focuses 
on particular contributions, so that it fails to convey the 
whole range of his inluence. In histories of various ields 
of social science, except for statistics and criminology 
where he always igures, his name rarely appears. I can-
not pretend to have conducted a thorough survey, but 
have examined all 22 histories of psychology in the Uni-
versity library. All of them of course deal with Francis 
Galton, but none mention Quetelet. As far as psychology 
is concerned, it is likely that the neglect began during the 
inter-war years. Edwin Boring ([1929] 1950, p. 477), in his 
classic history of experimental psychology, showed how 
Galton was inspired by Quetelet when he tried to assess 
the distribution of mental ability (a topic treated below); 
and he sketched the background of Quetelet’s ideas in his 
Notes (p. 499). Yet Gardner Murphy ([1928] 1938), in his 
once very prominent history of psychology, did not refer 
to Quetelet at all. More recently Danziger (1990), in his 
important work on the origins of psychological research, 
calls Quetelet ‘the pioneer of statistical social science’ (p. 
76) and notes his link with Galton. However, he does not 
elaborate on Quetelet’s contributions, nor discuss his 
inluence on Galton.1
Generally, omissions were not conined to histories of 
psychology. Admittedly more supericial scanning of his-
tories of anthropology and sociology, subjects to which 
Quetelet also made important contributions, yielded the 
same puzzling result.
Since familiarity with Quetelet cannot be assumed, 
the irst section is devoted to a sketch of the man and 
his work. hen follows an outline of the various ields 
that were fertilised by his ideas, thereby demonstrat-
ing his omission to be unjustiied; these ields are 
1 Danziger’s (1990) book is a landmark because he demonstrates historically 
how and when statistical thinking came to predominate in experimental 
psychology.
Open Access
*Correspondence:  g.jahoda@strath.ac.uk 
Department of Psychology, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK
Page 2 of 10Jahoda  SpringerPlus  (2015) 4:473 
somewhat arbitrarily grouped into several categories. 
he last section provides a summary of Quetelet’s major 
contributions.
On Quetelet
Life
Quetelet’s oeuvre is wide-ranging and complex, and so 
what can be ofered here is merely a greatly simpliied 
outline of his main ideas. Born in Ghent, which later 
became part of Belgium, Quetelet was a man of many 
and diverse talents. Aged 17, he became a teacher of 
mathematics at a private school, and at 19 was recruited 
to newly established College of Ghent as an instructor 
in mathematics. here Quetelet was a colleague of Gar-
nier, professor of astronomy and higher mathematics, an 
experience that shaped his career as a scientist. At that 
period he was also keen on the arts, being apprenticed to 
a painter and publishing poetry. In 1820 he was elected 
to the Royal Academy of Sciences in Brussels, and per-
suaded the Minister of Education that an observatory 
should be built. In preparation for this task he went to 
Paris in 1823 where he met prominent astronomers and 
mathematicians, including such great igures as Laplace, 
Fourier, and Poisson. It was they who inspired what was 
to become the core of his theories.
Quetelet gave lectures at the Brussels Museum on 
astronomy and probability, and published a popular book 
on astronomy. It was put on the Index of forbidden books 
by the Vatican, and the ensuing publicity greatly 
increased the size of his readership. He also conducted 
extensive meteorological studies, a topic then related to 
astronomy. In 1834 he was elected Permanent Secretary 
of the Brussels Academy of Arts and Sciences, and in 
1836 appointed Professor of Astronomy at the newly 
established Ecole Militaire in Brussels. By that time his 
international fame had been well established, and contin-
ued growing until his death. Some major biographical 
sources are listed in a footnote.2
The links between astronomy and the physiological 
and ‘moral’ (i.e. social) spheres
It is not known what prompted Quetelet to make this con-
nection, which is present in his Physique sociale (1835). 
He saw an analogy between the errors of measurement in 
astronomical observations and those entailed in data con-
cerned with human populations, both subject to what he 
called ‘the law of error’. he other key notion concerned the 
distribution of observations, which takes a ‘Gaussian’ form 
2 Edward Mailly (1875) has a long and detailed obituary. he main biogra-
phy is by Joseph Lottin (1912), which has been reprinted in 2012 (Memphis, 
USA: General Books); however, that text is full of errors and omissions. 
Useful biographical details can be found in the following: Frank Hankins 
([1908] 1986); heodor M. Porter (1986), and Oscar Shynin (1986).
(now called a ‘normal distribution’). his he regarded as a 
universal principle valid in astronomy as well as in studies 
of humans beings (and indeed of animals and plants). In all 
these spheres he did consider both extremes of distribu-
tions, but saw the mean as the most probable true value. As 
far as humans are concerned, the diference from astronomy 
lay for him in the fact that data about humans are subject 
to multiple sources of variation, which he called ‘acciden-
tal causes’. herefore one has to work with large numbers, 
where these variations cancel out; and provided the distri-
bution is normal, which he regarded as true of most physi-
cal and social characteristics, the mean relects a constant 
cause. his led him to postulate a concept that remained 
central to his theorising, namely that of the ‘average man’.
L’homme moyen (the average man)
Originally he himself saw this as a ictitious entity, but 
later Quetelet treated it as a genuine type representative 
of group membership, where the group ranges from the 
tribe, nation or race to humanity as a whole. he speci-
ication of l’homme moyen in terms of various physi-
cal or social features was the objective of nearly all his 
researches. Moreover, he regarded l’homme moyen as the 
epitome of all qualities, physical and moral. hus Quete-
let saw this person as the most moral, the most intelligent 
(at any particular stage, since he believed intelligence to 
advance progressively over generations), the most artis-
tic, the most beautiful, and so on. Quetelet thought that 
l’homme moyen is the product of a biological process, the 
kind of person nature had largely shaped. While certain 
aspects of this type constitute a human universal, oth-
ers vary according to nationality or race and undergo 
changes over time. Since the type depends in part on the 
features of particular societies, he extended his theory to 
cover this aspect (cf. Halbwachs 1913). Before presenting 
this extension, Quetelet’s irst major and most inluential 
work (briely mentioned above) will be outlined.
Physique Sociale (social physics)
he term ‘social physics’ appears in the original title 
(Quetelet [1835] 2013) of this important volume, describ-
ing his theory and reporting his early empirical studies. 
Subsequent publications elaborate the main thesis with-
out adding anything radically new. he empirical stud-
ies in this volume are mainly based on oicial statistics 
of various kinds. he irst part, entitled ‘Development of 
the physical qualities of men’, covers statistical materials 
on births and mortality, ending with comparative popu-
lation statistics and their implications. he second part 
traces the development with age of such physical features 
as height and weight, considered as manifestations of 
general laws. For instance, a table is headed: ‘Law of the 
growth of women’ (Quetelet [1835] 2013, p. 63).
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he third part, which attracted most attention and set 
of heated controversies, concerns the ‘moral and intel-
lectual qualities of man’. It was a daring and entirely 
novel attempt to subject to statistical analysis the kinds 
of topics until then usually reserved for philosophical 
discussions. Quetelet lacked the tools to deal systemati-
cally with intelligence, and so he fell back on records of 
achievement. In principle that was not a bad idea; but 
since he conined it to comparisons of French and Eng-
lish dramatists, it was not really illuminating. More inter-
esting are tables of the incidence of mental illness across 
several nations. However, the area which commentators 
highlighted was that of ‘moral qualities’. Among these the 
topic of crime igures most prominently, no doubt since 
it was one where ample data were available. hat made 
it possible to undertake numerous sophisticated analyses, 
including even curve-itting. It is not possible here to go 
into details, and only the sensational conclusion, adum-
brated at the beginning of the book, will be quoted:
he remarkable constancy with which the same 
crimes appear annually in the same order, drawing 
down on their perpetrators the same punishments, 
in the same proportions, is a singular fact… We 
might even predict annually how many individuals 
will stain their hands with the blood of their fellow-
men, how many will be forgers, how many will deal 
in poison, pretty nearly in the same way as we may 
foretell the annual births and deaths. (Quetelet 
[1835] 2013, pp. 6–7)
his regularity, which at irst astonished Quetelet him-
self, was attributed by him to the nature of society, to 
which he subsequently devoted another work.
On the social system and the laws that govern it (Quetelet 
1848)
When Quetelet mentions ‘laws’, as he does in the title 
of this book, it is not always clear whether he meant the 
term in a strict sense, such the laws of physics, or whether 
he referred merely to context-bound regularities. In the 
case of the social system it was certainly the latter. he 
task he set himself was that of describing the function-
ing of what he also called the ‘social body’, thereby hinting 
at an analogy with the individual one. he analogy is also 
shown by his discussing what he called the physiology of 
the ‘social body’, which can have illnesses and is liable to 
change within certain limits. For Quetelet there existed 
diferent kinds of social bodies in a hierarchy, humanity 
being the ultimate one where free will is entirely elimi-
nated and the laws are as irm as those which explain 
the movements of heavenly bodies; but most of time he 
is thinking of the nation or ‘society’ which is subject to 
change over time; and therefore so are its laws.
According to Quetelet there are constant and variable 
forces operative in society. he former are geographi-
cal features which favour or hinder the level of civiliza-
tion as well as causing the emergence of diferent races. 
he variable ones are traditions and customs as well as 
capricious collective opinions. In well-organised societies 
these forces cancel each other out and there prevails an 
equilibrium, albeit a gradually moving one since humans 
are capable of modifying their conditions of life. hereby 
they create ‘perturbations’ which afect the equilibrium, 
but only within narrow limits. As regards the collective 
level, he expressed his conviction about the operation of 
ixed laws in his Letters on probability (Quetelet [1845] 
1849, p. 178):
[he social body] subsists in virtue of conservative 
principles, as does everything which has proceeded 
from the hands of the Almighty: it also has its Physi-
ology… we ind laws as ixed as those which govern 
the heavenly bodies: we return to the phenomena of 
physics, where the freewill of man is entirely efaced, 
so that the work of the Creator may predominate 
without hindrance. he collection of these laws, 
which exist independently of time and of the caprices 
of man, form a separate science, which I have con-
sidered myself entitled to name social physics.
In spite this insistence on lawfulness, Quetelet empha-
sized that this did not imply stagnation—like most of 
his contemporaries he believed in progress. In fact he 
thought that his teachings could contribute to it by 
encouraging the use of statistics in various ields of 
knowledge.
Example of application of statistics
In the course of their education Albert (future Consort 
to Queen Victoria) and his brother spent some time in 
Brussels, where Quetelet was one of their tutors. In the 
above-mentioned Letters on probability sent to Albert, 
he dealt not merely with theory but also discussed sev-
eral potential practical applications of statistics related to 
such spheres as administration.
As will appear in due course, one of these chapters is 
specially relevant in the present context. Entitled ‘he use 
of statistics in the medical sciences’, its aim was to counter 
the prevalent scepticism of medical men regarding statis-
tics. It may be mentioned in passing that attitudes about 
which Quetelet complained were not conined to his 
period. Over a century later Richard Asher (1972), author 
of a critical medical book noted a dislike of statistics, par-
ticularly on the part of fashionable and successful doc-
tors. At any rate, on the basis of statistical considerations, 
Quetelet pointed out a series of weaknesses in medical 
practice. One is the attribution by doctors of diferent 
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causes and the use of diferent remedies with regard 
to the same illness. his he said was due to inadequate 
record keeping, coupled with faulty memory and inad-
equate communication. Consequently no real connection 
is established between the supposed cause and the rem-
edy, and the di culty of doing so is increased by the fact 
that there might be multiple causes. Quetelet suggested 
what has now become well understood, namely the need 
to compare the efectiveness of medicines ‘… by inquir-
ing what would become of [an ill person] if abandoned to 
the force of nature only’. he problem is less acute when it 
comes to public health, where calculation of probabilities 
is helpful in establishing causal factors. As far as hospitals 
are concerned, statistics collected from the major ones 
in Europe show that the mortality rates varies more with 
their directors than with their therapies: ‘I would say that 
a good administration perhaps saves more patients than 
the science of the most skilful doctors.’ (Quetelet [1845] 
1849, pp. 235–6).
As the above shows, Quetelet was not just a theorist 
but had some shrewd notions about how statistics could 
be usefully applied. his came to be recognised in due 
course by many of his contemporaries; and some of the 
ways in which his ideas resonated during the second half 
of the nineteenth century among prominent igures will 
now be discussed.
Illustrations of Quetelet’s inluence in various ields
History and philosophy
he Newtonian revolution made a huge impact on Euro-
pean thought. Several notable thinkers, inspired by 
Newton’s demonstration of the lawfulness of the physi-
cal universe, began to ask the question whether there 
might not be analogous causal laws governing mind and 
society. Among those who raised such issues was Con-
dorcet (1743–1794) who believed that the ‘moral sci-
ences’ were basically not inferior to the physical ones. An 
even more radically determinist view was held by Laplace 
(1749–1827), who famously declared that his ‘demon’, a 
super-intellect, could in principle forecast the future of 
everything in the universe. Although towards the end 
of the eighteenth century a reaction set in against the 
rationalist spirit of the Enlightenment, a strong vein of 
the earlier trend persisted. It took several similar forms 
and came under such labels as ‘determinism’, ‘material-
ism’ or (Comtian) ‘positivism’. While distinct notions, 
common trends among them included a rejection of 
romanticism with its emphasis on emotion and free will. 
In the clash between these contrasting ideologies, history 
and philosophy cannot be readily distinguished.
A key igure who sparked of debates that dominated 
the second half of the nineteenth century was Henry 
homas Buckle (1821–1862), an inheritor of the spirit of 
the Enlightenment.3 Buckle was a remarkable man. Self-
educated, he learned no fewer than eighteen languages 
and was a brilliant chess player. In 1857 he began to pub-
lish a monumental History of civilization in England 
(Buckle [1857] 1904) that was never completed. Yet what 
he did publish had an immense impact on his contempo-
raries, not only on scholars but also on the educated pub-
lic; and not just in Britain: there were translations into 
French, German, Russian, and other languages.
In the beginning of that work Buckle discusses Quete-
let at considerable length and uses him to underpin his 
thesis that history is subject to deterministic laws, and 
therefore ought to become a science in the same manner 
as the natural sciences. Buckle cites Quetelet on the regu-
larities to be found in social life; for example he rehearses 
Qetelet’s inding that the number of murders per year 
remains much the same, and that this even applies to the 
proportions of diferent killing methods employed. he 
conclusions Buckle draws form this are spelled out in a 
famous passage about suicide. After describing ‘self-mur-
der’ as seemingly ‘capricious and uncontrollable’, he goes 
on as follows:
… it is surely an astonishing fact that all the evi-
dence we possess respecting [suicide] points to one 
great conclusion, and can leave no doubt on our 
minds that suicide is merely the product of the gen-
eral condition of society, and that the individual 
felon only carries into efect what is a necessary con-
sequence of preceding circumstances. In a given state 
of society a certain number of persons must put an 
end to their own life. his is the general law; and the 
special question as to who shall commit the crime 
depends of course upon special laws; which, however 
in their total action must obey the large social law to 
which they are all subordinate. And the power of the 
larger law is so irresistible, that neither the love of 
life nor the fear of another world can avail anything 
towards even checking its operation. (Buckle [1857] 
1904, pp. 15–16).
It was the extraordinary success of Buckle’s History that 
brought Quetelet to the notice of an international reader-
ship, and thereby helped to spread his fame.
Buckle, believing himself to have established the exist-
ence of deterministic historical laws on the basis of 
Quetelet’s theory, proceeded for the remainder of his 
magnum opus to deploy an exceedingly ambitious his-
torical narrative—yet devoid of any statistics. Buckle 
attacked his fellow-historians for their narrow specializa-
tion and unwillingness or inability to generalise. He him-
self did not hesitate to do so, and some of the views he 
3 For details of his life see Giles St. Aubyn (1958).
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expressed, (e.g. about relationship between climate, food, 
population and the distribution of wealth) are plausible. 
Others, like his notion that intellectual development is 
inluenced by the extent to which Nature is violent (such 
as earthquakes), seem bizarre. At any rate he made no 
claim to having discovered historical laws analogous to 
those governing celestial motions—that he regarded as a 
task for the future.
Buckle’s radical claims had signiicant repercussions. 
Almost at once there were critics, and as far as Buckle’s 
historical analysis was concerned, they were largely suc-
cessful in demolishing it. However, his contention that 
history could and should become a science set of intense 
debates. Almost every prominent igure of the period 
took some part in them. he story of how historians 
reacted is described in detail by Ian Hesketh (2011). Phi-
losophers like John Stuart Mill discussed the issues, and 
even distinguished scientists like Darwin and Clerk Max-
well commented on Buckle’s views about the nature of 
scientiic method.
Buckle’s remarkable success also had wider implica-
tions for philosophical issues. While Quetelet regarded 
only large-scale social phenomena as subject to law, 
Buckle went well beyond that in holding that all individ-
ual human actions are also lawfully determined. his of 
course amounted to a denial of the possibility of free will, 
thereby undermining basic tenets of Christianity. he 
ensuing debate was the irst of its kind only in so far as it 
turned on the implications of statistical regularities. In 
Britain a major igure writing in defence of free will was 
the philosopher of probability, John Venn (1866); he 
rejected the notion that social events can occur indepen-
dently of human motives, a doctrine he called ‘fatalism’. 
In Germany the debate was more wide-ranging, probably 
because materialism was more widespread there at the 
time. 4
Administration and economics
Quetelet’s direct inluence on administration was most 
pronounced in the case of Florence Nightingale (1820–
1910). Known to the public as the ‘Lady of the Lamp’, 
her popular fame is based on her work with injured 
and diseased soldiers during the Crimean War. How-
ever, her achievements were far more extensive. When 
she returned from the Crimea to Britain in 1856, she 
embarked on a mission to bring about sanitary reforms 
and gained the support of many prominent igures. As 
4 Buckle’s thesis was widely discussed on the continent, notably in Ger-
many. For instance, on the issue of history as a science see Johann Droys-
den (1863). As regards determinism versus free will, Adolph Wagner (1864) 
tends to support the former, while Moritz Drobisch (1867) writing in the 
Kantian tradition proposes that the stability of the will accounts for the reg-
ularity of social statistics.
regards statistics, she obtained the help of William Farr, 
a medical doctor who had become an expert on statistics 
of public health, and they collaborated over many years.
It is not clear when Florence Nightingale irst came 
across Quetelet’s writings. Edward T. Cook (1913), her 
biographer claims that she had read the irst edition of 
the Physique Sociale (1835), but that is doubtful. What is 
certain is that she was familiar with Quetelet’s ([1845] 
1849) Letters on probability theory, since she said that 
‘Quetelet’s chapter on medicine alone is a book for a 
whole Profession to work out’.5 his chapter is briely out-
lined above, at the end of the section on Quetelet’s life.
he only personal meeting between Florence Nightin-
gale and Quetelet took place in 1860 at the International 
Statistical Congress held in London. By that time she had 
become an invalid and Quetelet as well as other delegates 
visited her at home. hey remained in contact by corre-
spondence, and he presented her with the two volumes of 
the 1869 edition of the Physique Sociale. Florence Night-
ingale’s response, which shows the extent of her admira-
tion, began as follows: ‘Homage to Monsieur Quetelet, 
creator of statistics…’.6 Pearson (1914–1930, vol. II, p. 
414) who saw the original copies, says that every page 
was annotated by her. She was rightly dubbed a ‘passion-
ate statistician’, since her devotion to this ield was 
imbued with religious fervour (McDonald 1998). She felt 
that conducting social research was a way of discovering 
divine laws designed to bring about moral progress. Here 
again her thinking was in harmony with that of Quetelet, 
as is clear from the passage from his Letters cited above, 
where he referred to ‘the hands of the Almighty’. Florence 
Nightingale’s faith was in complete harmony with the 
spirit of Quetelet, and she seems to have been ready to 
accept almost any of his pronouncements.7
In sum, it was Florence Nightingale’s conviction that 
the use of statistics is essential not just for administra-
tors, but also for legislators and politicians whose plans 
should be based on the relevant knowledge—otherwise 
they risk failure. She even attempted, together with Fran-
cis Galton, to establish university courses of statistics; but 
that was not successful at the time.
While Florence Nightingale was concerned with the 
practical applications of statistics, the writings of Wil-
liam Stanley Jevons (1835–1882) dealt with economic 
5 Cited in Diamond and Stone (1981, p. 73).
6 Cited in Diamond and Stone (1981, p. 71).
7 his is shown by a story recorded by her biographer, which also illustrates 
the wide range of Quetelet’s interests. Based on his work in meteorology, he 
proposed a law governing the lowering of plants. It is said to occur when 
‘…the sum of the squares of the mean daily temperature, counted from the 
end of the frosts, equals 4246 degrees C.’ Apparently Florence Nightingale 
suggested to her gardening friends that they should do these calculations in 
order to verify the law. It is not stated whether any of them followed this 
suggestion (Cook 1913, vol. 1, pp. 429–30).
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theory. He was thoroughly familiar with Quetelet’s work 
and made extensive use of his ideas (Mosselmans 2005; 
White 1994). Jevons quoted extensively from the Letters 
on Probability, including the ‘law of error’ and particu-
larly the concept of the ‘average man’. Jevons transposed 
that concept to the body of consumers and their behav-
iours. he rate of consumption of the collectivity was said 
to be governed by price, while the purchasing behaviour 
of individuals depends on their individual motives and 
resources and will therefore difer widely. However, like 
Quetelet, Jevons suggests that in the aggregate these par-
ticular ‘accidental’ factors will cancel each other out. he 
theory is of course much further elaborated, but its main 
thesis owes a great deal to Quetelet.
A much more important igure In economics and 
politics was Karl Marx (1818–1883). Although less is 
known in detail about his debt to Quetelet, there is no 
doubt that he was well acquainted with his work (cf. 
Wells 2013) Marx seldom quoted him, but there are 
exceptions. In an article on capital punishment in the 
New York Tribune (February 18, 1853) he writes ‘Mr. A. 
Quetelet, in this excellent and learned work l’Homme et 
ses facultés…’.
here are only two passages in Capital, where he refers 
to Quetelet: in connection with the issue of surplus value 
Marx discusses problems of individual diferences and 
the elimination of ‘random errors’ by averaging (Marx 
[1867] 1981, vol. 1, p. 440); and he agrees with Quetelet 
on the nature of statistical regularities when he states that 
‘the law of value’ is visible only when accidental varia-
tions are combined in large numbers’ (Marx [1867] 1981, 
vol. 3, p. 976); Furthermore, the whole structure of his 
approach in terms of lawfulness is reminiscent of Quete-
let’s arguments in On the social system and the laws that 
govern it. his issue of lawfulness is discussed by Enield 
(1976). It is hardly necessary to point out the far-reaching 
consequences of the ideology to whose formation Quete-
let contributed.
Sociology and anthropology
he word ‘sociology’ is doubly connected to Quete-
let. Auguste Comte (1798–1857) had initially called his 
approach to the study of society ‘social physics’, in spite 
of the fact that his ‘positive philosophy’ was devoid of 
quantitative elements. Yet when Quetelet adopted that 
term, Comte abandoned it for fear of being regarded 
merely as a follower; instead, he invented the term ‘soci-
ology’. he other connection is that Quetelet saw himself 
as founding the scientiic study of society by means of 
statistics, and as such creating a kind of sociology. It is 
therefore not surprising that one of the most prominent 
sociologists of the late nineteenth century was inlu-
enced by him.
Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) irst took up some of 
Quetelet’s ideas and modiied them in his book on he 
rules of sociological method (Durkheim [1895] 1982). 
here he treated Quetelet’s ‘average’ type as represent-
ing the normal as distinct from the deviant; moreover, he 
linked it to the collective mind, which he regarded as the 
determinant of the regularities in social phenomena such 
as the crime rate. his line of thought was further devel-
oped in the volume on suicide, which was one of the irst 
sociological studies following Quetelet’s lead by using 
statistics.
In his classic work on suicide (Durkheim [1897] 1952) 
he starts by outlining Quetelet’s main thesis and then 
proceeds to an elaborate critique—largely justiied it 
must be said. His main critique concerns the inferences 
based on the concept of the ‘average man’. It will be 
recalled that Quetelet had sought to explain the regular-
ity of crimes and suicides on the basis that the ‘average 
man’ has some disposition towards crime and suicide, 
but only those who deviate strongly enough actually 
commit these acts. Now as regards suicide, Durkheim 
points out that it is much rarer than crime, so that the 
probability that any individual will commit suicide is 
close to zero. More generally, he criticises Quetelet’s 
focus on the individual which, given the variability of 
dispositions such as motivations, cannot serve as an 
explanation. Durkheim himself maintained that that 
there are external forces independent from and imping-
ing on the individual from the outside, namely ‘collective 
representations’. It is these, he argues, which account for 
the regularities in the rates of suicide within particu-
lar nations. It is a thesis that has been widely debated 
among sociologists.
In view of Quetelet’s aim to create what has been called 
a ‘mathematics of society’ (Porter 1985), it is paradoxical 
that sociology is the one sphere where Quetelet’s ideas 
have left little trace. here was a long gap between Dur-
kheim’s use of statistics and the wider adoption of statis-
tical methods in more recent sociology, where Quetelet’s 
name is seldom if ever mentioned.
Another contemporary of Quetelet was Edward Bur-
nett Tylor (1832–1917), sometimes known as ‘the father 
of anthropology’. While not the irst to use the word ‘cul-
ture’ more or less in its modern sense, he can certainly 
be credited with deining the concept and ensuring its 
wide adoption. One of his major works is entitled Primi-
tive Culture (Tylor 1871), and in its introductory pages 
one reads: ‘To many educated minds there seems to be 
something presumptuous and repulsive in the view that 
the history of mankind is part and parcel of the history of 
nature, that our thoughts, wills, and actions accord with 
laws as deinite as those which govern the motions of 
the waves, the combinations of acids and bases, and the 
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growth if plants and animals’ (Tylor [1871] 1958, p. 2). A 
few pages later he refers directly to Quetelet and details 
the regularity of phenomena such as crime rates, exactly 
as documented by Quetelet. he following year he pub-
lished a review of two of Quetelet’s major works, namely 
Physique Sociale and Anthropométrie (Tylor 1872). In this 
piece he refers with approval to homas Buckle’s doc-
trine of history’s inexorable laws. He also tries to deal 
with the objection that humans have free will, by saying 
that free will is of limited range—suicient to prevent us 
from predicting the behaviour of individuals, but ceasing 
when it comes to the collective actions of large numbers 
of people.
In this connection Tylor discusses Quetelet’s con-
cept of ‘the average man’, explaining that it refers to the 
modal type around which the population of a nation or 
race clusters, and which is a kind of representation of the 
whole. He mentions the measurements of the heights of 
26,000 American soldiers, used to show that the distri-
butions conforms to the ‘law of binomial expansion’. his 
approach, he contends, will make it possible to clearly 
characterise a nation or a race as contrasted with the 
usual vague ideas. Tylor further notes that in the Anthro-
pométrie ‘M. Quetelet inds a small number of selected 
individuals suicient for ascertaining the standard 
national proportions..’ (Tylor 1872, p. 363). Now given 
that Quetelet usually dealt with large numbers, that calls 
for some elucidation.
Near the beginning of Quetelet’s Anthropométrie (1870, 
pp. 23–24), one is surprised to ind the following passage:
Are the accidental causes which divide people within 
a given country suiciently numerous and inluen-
tial that it is necessary to resort to a large number of 
persons in order to eliminate the particular features 
they present? Experiment teaches us that the answer 
is negative. [here follows a brief account of the 
‘experiments without suicient details; Quetelet then 
concludes that]… it has in efect become unnecessary 
to have recourse to a great number of persons, since 
ten were generally suicient to provide a mean value 
that departed little from the type I had intended to 
determine. [my translation]
his procedure certainly did not entail random sam-
pling, as is clear from the parts of the volume dealing 
with diferent human races. Taking advantage of the pres-
ence in Brussels of individuals belonging to other races, 
he measured them in his usual exceedingly detailed man-
ner. So one inds tables comparing three young American 
Indians (O-jib-be-wass), ten Belgian soldiers and, curi-
ously, a white American athlete; or again, even more 
absurdly, one Chinese man and one Chinese woman are 
compared with one Belgian of each sex. A reasonable 
explanation for such aberrations, ofered by Quetelet’s 
biographer Lottin, is that, after a stroke in 1855, his intel-
lectual powers sufered a sharp decline.8
It is now possible to understand Tylor’s contention that 
small numbers of ‘typical’ individuals are suicient to 
arrive at the key features of an ethnic group. He recom-
mends this method to anthropologists, and in a footnote 
he ofers as an example a brief report on the heights of 
thirty Chippewa Indians by General Lefroy (1870). On 
consulting this report one inds that these Indians unex-
pectedly turned up at a trading station and were dra-
gooned into being measured. Whether or not they were 
‘typical’ is an open question. Later generations of [espe-
cially British] anthropologists did in fact usually rely on a 
small number of ‘informants’. However, that was probably 
in the belief that they were tapping Durkheim’s ‘collective 
representations’ rather than owing to Tylor having fol-
lowed Quetelet’s erroneous suggestion.
A more signiicant contribution by Tylor, inspired 
partly by Quetelet and partly by Adolphe Bastian (who 
had stressed the importance of statistics for anthropol-
ogy) was his pioneering study of ‘adhesions’ between 
social institutions (Tylor 1889). In this he tried to estab-
lish the social-evolutionary development of institutions 
by tracing what we would call ‘correlations’ between 
them.9 his led ultimately to the setting up of the Human 
Relations Area Files (HRAF) at Yale, which is still used 
test hypotheses about cultural elements across the globe.
Psychology
he bulk of Quetelet’s empirical work dealt with physi-
cal features of humans and crime rates, but he was also 
interested in what he called man’s intellectual qualities. 
However, as noted above, his approach was not very 
fruitful. he problem was taken up by Francis Galton 
(1822–1911), cousin of Darwin, who was a many-sided 
genius interested in psychometry and statistics. Galton 
was inspired by Quetelet, though he tackled the issue of 
intelligence in quite a diferent manner. In the preface to 
Hereditary genius ([1869] 1914, p. 11) he describes how 
the ‘law of error’ had been applied by Quetelet
… to the proportions of the human body, on the 
grounds that the diferences, say in stature, between 
men of the same race might theoretically be treated 
as if they were Errors [sic] made by Nature in her 
attempt to mould individual men… according to the 
same ideal pattern [i.e. the average man]. Fantastic 
8 Quetelet’s lack of concern with sampling issues and his tendency to make 
wide generalizations from a few cases persists even today. It happens espe-
cially in experimental social psychology, where a small number of students 
are sometimes taken to represent humanity at large.
9 Galton, who was present when Tylor expounded his thesis, pointed out a 
possible source of error which is still known as ‘Galton’s problem’.
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as such a notion may appear… it can be shown to 
rest on a perfectly just basis.
his conception, he notes, had enabled Quetelet to 
make theoretical predictions about body dimensions that 
itted the observed data. Galton then took a crucial jump:
Now, if this be the case with stature, then it will be 
true as regards every other physical feature – as cir-
cumference of head, size of brain, weight of grey mat-
ter, number of brain ibres, etc.; and thence, by a step 
on which no physiologist will hesitate, as regards 
mental capacity. (Galton [1869] 1914, p. 28)
Unlike Quetelet, who had focused on the average, Gal-
ton considered the whole of the normal curve and took 
a radical step by postulating that it relected the distri-
bution of mental ability in a population—an assumption 
that underlies all subsequent intelligence-testing. He 
tried out this hunch in relation to examination marks, 
making theoretical predictions on the basis of the normal 
curve and demonstrating a good it between predictions 
and actual results. hereby encouraged, Galton devised 
a set of seven—admittedly arbitrary—grades of mental 
ability from A to G, assuming the intervals between them 
to be equal. It is not necessary here to go into the details 
of his rather complex scheme, but some of its salient fea-
tures will be outlined. Using census data for England and 
Wales as his basis, he calculated the frequency of each 
grade per million individuals. It should also be explained 
that, unusually for us, he divided each grade into two 
parts above and below the median, the former having 
greater and the latter lesser ability. he irst grade clusters 
about the median and comprises one in every four peo-
ple. Together with the second grade, this accounts for the 
bulk of the population which he characterised as ‘medio-
cre’. In order to make this more concrete, he described it 
as typical of people in provincial gatherings. he upper 
half of Grade C, he suggested, corresponds roughly to the 
ability of the foreman of an ordinary jury. At the extreme 
ends of the distribution, namely the two parts of G, are 
the extraordinarily rare geniuses at the top and idiots at 
the bottom. At the end of this section he comments on 
the huge range of ability among humans.
As mentioned above, Quetelet had also discussed the 
characteristics human races, and this may well have led 
Galton to address that theme, as he did towards the end 
of the volume. However, he again tackled this in a difer-
ent and more systematic way. Referring to Darwin’s law 
of natural selection, Galton argues that the evolutionary 
process will have diferentially shaped the abilities of dif-
ferent races. In evaluating comparative abilities, he claims 
to have made use of ‘the law of deviation from the aver-
age’, though no numerical data were available. In arriving 
at what he modestly calls ‘a rough provisional inquiry’, he 
once again assumed that the intervals are the same in all 
races so that ‘If the ability of class A in one race be equal 
to the ability of class C in another, then the ability of class 
B of the former shall be supposed equal to that of class D 
of the latter, and so on.’ (Galton [1869] 1914, p. 326).
he only ethnic group dealt with in some detail was 
the ‘Negro race’, which he compared with the Anglo-
Saxon one. He begins by acknowledging that the ‘negro 
[sic] race’ in America is handicapped by social disabilities 
and therefore they cannot be fairly compared—hence the 
need ‘for much rougher data’. For that purpose he looked 
at some ‘occasional’ high achievers such as Toussaint 
l’Ouverture, whom he regarded as atypical. his led him 
to suggest that blacks are at least two grades below those 
of whites. hen he admitted that there are blacks clearly 
superior to the average of whites, which would mean that 
they were of class C or even D.
In another line of argument Galton considers Africans 
in their own country, conceding that ‘a native chief is well 
versed in the art of ruling men’; nonetheless he contends 
that a visiting European traveller never has any trouble 
dealing with them. Finally, Galton claims that a very large 
number of Negroes are ‘half-witted’: ‘Every book alluding 
to negro servants in America is full of instances. I was 
myself much impressed by this fact during my travels in 
Africa. he mistakes the negroes made in their own mat-
ters were so childish, stupid, and simpleton-like, as fre-
quently to make me ashamed of my own species’ (Galton 
[1869] 1914, p. 328). he notion of the stupidity of black 
servants persisted well into the twentieth century. A biol-
ogist as distinguished as Julian Huxley made the same 
observation in his younger days (Huxley 1924).10 he 
remainder of the chapter consists of somewhat difuse 
remarks. hus Galton reckoned that ‘the Australian type’ 
is probably at least one grade below Africans, that Low-
land Scots and people from the north of England are dei-
nitely ‘a fraction of a grade’ above the ‘ordinary English’, 
and he ends by speculating about the ancient Greeks, as 
Quetelet had done.
he grading of mental abilities was not the only area in 
which Galton built upon the foundations laid by Quete-
let. Another was that of composite photographs (Galton 
1879), where pictures of particular categories of people 
are superimposed. hey are said to represent various types 
such as criminals (a line later famously followed by Cesare 
Lombroso ([1876] 1911). In that paper Galton explains its 
title (Generic images) as follows: ‘he word generic pre-
supposes a genus, that is to say a collection of individuals 
who have much in common, and among whom medium 
10 In fairness it should be mentioned that Huxley later became a strong 
opponent of Racism.
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characteristics are very much more frequent than extreme 
ones. he same idea is sometimes expressed by the word 
typical, which was much used by Quetelet, who was the 
irst to give it a rigorous interpretation, and whose idea of 
a type lies at the basis of his statistical views’ (Galton 1879, 
p. 162). He further applied this notion to the concept of 
‘race’ saying that it constitutes a typical form around 
which various features cluster, and that will also be true 
of their descendants. Galton also directly compared com-
posite photographs to Quetelet’s ‘homme moyen’. All this 
shows Galton’s considerable indebtedness to Quetelet.
he above survey, designed to illustrate the pervasive 
inluence of Quetelet’s ideas throughout the second half 
of the nineteenth century, is of course far from compre-
hensive. His contribution to the development of statisti-
cal methods, while certainly not negligible, is probably 
less signiicant than the eforts he made over the years to 
encourage in various countries the systematic collection 
of standardised statistical information. his he envisaged 
in such ields as population, economics, medicine, and 
what he called ‘morals’ (of which crime was the most sali-
ent). Quetelet was further instrumental in organising the 
irst international congress of statistics in 1853, intended 
to bring together people working in oices of statistics, 
for whose creation he had often been responsible. In 
sum, he played a major role in initiating the collection 
of statistics, information essential for the functioning of 
modern society (cf. Derosières 2002). Finally, there is one 
concept he elaborated that is still extensively applied at 
present, namely BMI, the ‘Body Mass Index’ (Eknoyan 
2008).
It should be clear from the above that Quetelet’s 
ideas were among the main driving forces generating 
the behavioural sciences as we know them today. In his 
own time his brilliance was generally recognized and he 
enjoyed the esteem that was his due. His ideas, as has 
been shown, were borrowed by others and incorporated 
into their own opus, often with little or no acknowledge-
ment of their source as a few examples will show. he 
immense intellectual ediice constructed by Marx incor-
porates some of Quetelet’s basic tenets, as is revealed by 
the key passage below:
Also when a society has discovered the natural laws 
of its development – and it the ultimate purpose of 
this work to unveil the law of the economic develop-
ment of modern society – it can neither leapfrog the 
natural phases of development, nor make them go 
away by issuing a decree. (my emphases and trans-
lation) (Marx 1867, p. 14)
his phrasing, with its stress on the natural character of 
societal changes, closely echoes Quetelet’s formulations; 
yet Marx merely mentions him in a footnote.
Tylor’s inluential piece on ‘adhesions’, which ulti-
mately resulted in the HRAF, employs Quetelet’s 
language (e.g. ‘laws of error’) but his name does 
not appear. Again, Quetelet’s project was that of 
pioneering a ‘social physics’, or as we would say a 
quantitative sociology. Yet John Stuart Mill (1879, 
II, p. 490) wrote about Comte that he was ‘the only 
thinker who, with a competent knowledge of scien-
tiic methods in general, has attempted to charac-
terize the Method of Sociology…’; and that in spite of 
the fact that Comte’s system lacks any quantitative 
element. So the admirers of Comte ensured that he 
came to be regarded as the founder of sociology.
Enough has probably been said to show how others 
made use of Quetelet’s ideas in their own work which 
ensured their fame, a fame that survives to the present. 
By contrast, Quetelet himself has sunk into obscurity 
within several of the disciplines he had helped to cre-
ate: that is surely an injustice, and he deserves to be 
remembered.
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